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C ONFLICT of laws involves three major areas: judicial jurisdiction,
choice of law, and judgments.' During this survey period Texas case
law indicates that judicial jurisdiction is in a state of flux, that choice of
law remains unchanged, and that there is a great deal of activity, if not
change, in the area of judgments.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Voluntary Self-Restraint. Perhaps the most interesting case raising the is-
sue of subject matter jurisdiction is Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing
Co.2 Nelson Bunker Hunt discovered and produced oil pursuant to an
exploration and production concession from Libya. When Libya subse-
quently nationalized the oil field, Hunt published notices in newspapers
throughout the world claiming that Libya's conduct was in violation of
international law, 3 and threatened to bring suit against anyone coming
into possession of the disputed oil. Undeterred by these notices, Coastal
States Gas Producing Company and Coastal States Marketing, Inc., here-
inafter collectively referred to as "Coastal States," entered into a contract
with the Libyan oil company to purchase oil from the "Hunt" field. The
parties consummated the contract, and Hunt thereupon filed suit against
Coastal States for conversion of the oil. Since the defendant's possession
of the oil would not constitute conversion if Libya had good title to that
oil, the case turned on the validity of Libya's expropriation. This question
depended on whether the act of state doctrine,4 which prevents the courts
of one sovereign from inquiring into the acts of another, prohibited the
* A.B., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., New York University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Baylor University.
1. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 2-8 (3d ed. 1977).
2. 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ filed).
3. See generally Lowenfeld, Reflections on Expropriation and the Future of Investment
in the Americas, 7 INT'L LAW. 116 (1973); Whiteman, 8 DIG. INT'L L. 1020 (1967). Both
discuss expropriation in international law.
4. The act of state doctrine may be summarized as follows:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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Texas court from examining the Libyan expropriation. Although the doc-
trine was judicially created,5 the Supreme Court has said that it has "Con-
stitutional underpinnings."6 Limitations on the doctrine have been
accepted, however, and Hunt claimed that all of the major limitations were
applicable in his suit.
First, Hunt urged the so-called Bernstein exception. The Second Circuit
in 1954 held that the basic purpose of the act of state doctrine is to avoid
impairing the President's conduct of foreign affairs.' Thus, given this pur-
pose, the President could clearly authorize a suit if he felt it would not
impair the conduct of foreign affairs.' The court in Hunt, however, prop-
erly concluded that the Bernstein exception is no longer valid.9 Thus the
court did not consider whether statements issued by the State Department
declaring that the nationalization violated international law were sufficient
to show a waiver of the President's sole right to conduct foreign affairs.
In his second argument Hunt asserted that the activity of the Libyan
Government related to a commercial and not a governmental undertaking,
a distinction drawn by Mr. Justice White in Alfred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba.'" The act of state doctrine is clearly applicable to acts
that governments are traditionally expected to perform (jure imperii), but
its application to activities of the government that normally would be un-
dertaken by the private sector (jure gestionis) is questionable. Mr. Justice
White would apply the act of state doctrine only to jure imperii acts. This
analysis is troublesome, however, because perceptions are changing
throughout the world as to the proper roles that governments and private
industries should undertake. The distinction between acts jure imperii and
jure gestionis has been applied in cases involving the doctrine of sovereign
immunity,"l but as Mr. Justice Marshall correctly pointed out in his dis-
sent in Dunhill, "the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state...
differ fundamentally in their focus and in their operation. Sovereign im-
munity accords a defendant exemption from suit by virtue of its status. By
contrast, the act of state doctrine exempts no one from the process of the
5. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
6. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). The constitutional
doctrine referred to by the court is the reluctance of the federal judiciary to entertain politi-
cal questions for fear of infringing upon the domain of the executive branch. Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, Etc., 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
8. Id at 375-76.
9. 570 S.W.2d at 507. In First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759 (1972), Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun rejected the Bernstein excep-
tion because the validity of a foreign act of state is a "political question not cognizable in our
courts." Id at 787-88. Mr. Justice Powell also disapproved of the Bernstein exception since
he "would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive
the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction." Id at 773.
10. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
I1. The State Department announced a shift in United States policy toward applying
sovereign immunity only to jure imperii actions in the "Tate Letter," issued on May 19,
1952. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (F952).
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court."" 2 The court in Hunt correctly noted that Dunhill's commercial act
limitation on the act of state doctrine was not adopted by a majority of the
Supreme Court. In any event, the court held that the act of nationalizing
an oil concession is clearly a governmental and not a commercial act.
Hunt also argued that the Hickenlooper amendment' 3 required that the
court disregard the act of state doctrine. If the act of state doctrine does
have constitutional underpinnings, the validity of the amendment is
clearly in doubt. It is, therefore, not surprising that the courts have read
this law quite narrowly to avoid raising difficult constitutional issues.' 4
These narrow interpretations have established three elements that must be
present before the Hickenlooper amendment will be applied. First, the
expropriated property must come within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. Secondly, the act of the expropriating state must be in vio-
lation of international law. Thirdly, the asserted claim must be a claim of
title or other right to property. 5 The court found it necessary to consider
only the third of these conjunctive requirements. Hunt's claim arose from
the concession agreement with Libya. The court held that under Texas
conffict of laws, Libyan substantive law should govern the interpretation of
this agreement, as Libya was both the place of the contract's execution and
the place of performance. 6 Since under Libyan law the concession agree-
ment granted a mere contract right rather than a property right, the Hick-
enlooper amendment did not apply.
Finally, Hunt argued that the act of state doctrine does not apply when
the individual and the expropriating state execute an agreement enunciat-
ing controlling legal principles. Hunt based this argument on the follow-
ing language from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of the suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding control-
ling legalprinciples, even if the complaint alleges that the taking vio-
lates customary international law. '7
12. 425 U.S. at 725. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun joined in Mr. Justice
Marshall's dissent.
13. This amendment, which is also known as the Sabbatino amendment, provides:
[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the princi-
ples of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state. . . based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking . . . by an act of that state in
violation of the principles of international law ....
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
14. Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461, 471
(W.D. La. 1975); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 112
(C.D. Cal. 1971), a'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); United
Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Tex. 1977).
15. 570 S.W.2d at 508.
16. Id A question was raised as to whether Hunt and Libya contractually had chosen a
particular law to govern. See notes 157-60 infra and accompanying text.
17. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals professed an inability to determine what "type" of
unambiguous agreement the opinion referred to, 8 and in any event con-
cluded that the language was inapplicable because "Libya did not expro-
priate property (the oil) from Hunt."' 9 Since Hunt was unable to fit his
case within any of the established exceptions to the act of state doctrine,
the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Coastal States.
The court in Hunt did a good job of applying the act of state doctrine as
it currently stands, but the four issues raised in that case deserve a more
comprehensive treatment. Since currently there is no pervasive view at the
Supreme Court level, the lower courts will be forced to develop guidelines
for this doctrine of judicial self-restraint. Perhaps in a case similar to Hunt
the decision will turn on the fact that no state is directly involved. In Hunt
the action was a conversion suit between private entities, both of whom
were clearly subject to the jurisdiction of courts within the United States.
Any effect on foreign affairs was at best indirect. If, however, Libya is
immune from successful suit, it is questionable whether the normal rules of
conversion would apply. It does not seem proper for Coastal States to be
held liable when Libya would not be. While the dictates of reason might
indicate that in suits between American oil companies no great injustice is
likely to result from refusing to apply the act of state doctrine, the possibil-
ity of unbridled parochialism, which generates exposure to the double
edged sword of reciprocity, offers a telling argument against limiting appli-
cation of the doctrine to suits against foreign states. 20
The expansionist propensity of Texas oil companies made it predictable
that the principles of judicial self-restraint embodied in the act of state
doctrine would find expression in Texas courts. Perhaps it was equally
predictable that Texans would mourn the passing of "their" property own-
ership in the United States of Mexico. A Mr. C.J. Brannan had owned two
ranches in Mexico, both of which had been expropriated by the Mexican
Government. 2' Brannan sought compensation by attaching pre-Colum-
18. The language in question is not difficult to understand. It says that if there exists a
treaty, or perhaps an executive agreement, that sets forth controlling legal principles, then
the court should adjudicate alleged violations of the pact and apply the principles contained
therein. The essential elements would be (1) that the sovereign states have agreed to "con-
trolling legal principles" that the court can determine and apply, and (2) that there is an
express or implied acceptance of the propriety of having applications of the rule determined
in the courts of one of the states. Only a treaty or its equivalent in international law would
come within this exception to the act of state doctrine. As a result, Hunt's assertion that the
concession agreement was the type of "unambiguous agreement" referred to was not well-
founded.
19. 570 S.W.2d at 510. "Libyan Law Number 42 did expropriate the physical assets of
Hunt but Libya never relinquished its ownership of the oil, and consequently cannot have
expropriated it from Hunt." Id
20. Numerous commodities, including oil, move through many different ownerships in
international trade. Failure to allow invocation of the act of state doctrine by a remote
owner in a suit by the original owner could have an unsettling effect on international com-
merce.




bian artifacts that were owned by the United States of Mexico but were
temporarily within the State of Texas. Mexico filed a motion to dismiss,
urging a lack of jurisdiction, but the motion was denied. Mexico then
sought a writ of mandamus from the Texas Supreme Court in UnitedMex-
ican States v. 4shley.
22
The Texas Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
barred Brannan's suit against Mexico. Brannan argued that the trial court
had jurisdiction to consider the case because sovereign immunity had to be
established by the facts at trial, but the supreme court declared that the
doctrine precluded any exercise of jurisdiction.23 The court noted that
"[s]overeign immunity has been modified and ...that restrictive sover-
eign immunity is now the law in the United States."24 The court also
noted that "[tihe doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity denies immu-
nity to sovereigns when the suit arises out of a purely commercial capac-
ity."'25 The court correctly concluded, however, that the expropriation of
lands is not a commercial activity.
Mexico also asserted that the act of state doctrine barred the suit. As
might be expected, Brannan argued that the trial court should ignore the
act of state doctrine due to the Hickenlooper amendment. 26 The Texas
Supreme Court properly noted that "[c]ourts have narrowly construed the
Amendment and have held it to be inapplicable in situations where prop-
erty is expropriated by a foreign sovereign, and neither the expropriated
property nor its proceeds are in the United States."'27 Since in the case at
bar neither the property nor its proceeds were in the United States, the
statute was held inapplicable.
The results of the Hunt and Ashley cases are valid. A sovereign state's
conduct within its own territory should be condemned only by commercial
reality or on the basis of an international agreement.
Constitutional Restraints on Advisory Opinions. Article 5, section 8 of the
Texas Constitution 2a prohibits state couts from rendering advisory opin-
ions. Although the Texas Legislature has empowered state courts to issue
declaratory judgments, 29 the legislature cannot enlarge the courts' consti-
tutional jurisdiction. Hence, Texas courts may render declaratory judg-
ments only when there is a true justiciable controversy. 30 A question often
22. 556 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1977).
23. The court in Ashley accurately stated the effect of the doctrine: sovereign immunity
completely bars the mandatory subjection of one sovereign to the courts of another. The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). There is a significant
distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and the immunity of certain property from
execution, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity embraces the former concept.
24. 556 S.W.2d at 785-86; see notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
25. 556 S.W.2d at 786.
26. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976); see notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
27. 556 S.W.2d at 786.
28. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8.
29. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524 -1 (Vernon 1965).
30. California Prod., Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 160 Tex. 586, 588-89, 334
S.W.2d 780, 781 (1960).
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arises as to whether a declaratory action involves a true justiciable contro-
versy, or whether it is an unconstitutional attempt to obtain a judicial de-
termination of a hypothetical question, a contingent question, or a
question not essential to the resolution of a justiciable controversy.
This issue arose once again in the case of National Savings Insurance Co.
v. Gaskins.3" An insect exterminator sprayed an apartment complex, and a
daughter of one of the tenants was allegedly injured by substances used in
the extermination. The tenant sued the extermination company. The ex-
termination company held a National Savings Insurance Company policy
that was in effect at the time of the alleged injury. National, however, pled
noncoverage because the insured had failed to give timely notice, and
sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend the insured.
Plaintiffs in the suit pending against the insured were made defendants.
The tenants sought to have themselves removed as parties, arguing that
"since they were not parties to the insurance contract and did not care
who, if anyone, defended the insured, they had no interest adverse to Na-
tional, therefore no justiciable controversy existed."3
National relied on Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacfic Coal & Oil Co. ," a
case in which the Supreme Court held that a similar fact situation involved
a justiciable controversy. National argued that the test used by the United
States Supreme Court "is virtually identical to the one followed in
Texas."34 The Fort Worth court of civil appeals held that regardless of
whether the tests were the same, Firemen's Insurance Co. v. Burch35 was
the controlling precedent. In that case the Texas Supreme Court held that
the determination of a casualty insurer's duty to pay a judgment that might
be granted against its insured would be hypothetical before such a judg-
ment was actually granted. Thus, the court held that in the instant case no
justiciable controversy existed.
National next contended that by the terms of the Declaratory Judgment
Act 36 the tenant-plaintiffs were necessary parties because they had an in-
terest that would be affected by the declaration. The interest alleged was
that of collecting any judgment received in their suit against the extermi-
nators. National further argued that if the tenants were not joined, a de-
termination in the declaratory judgment suit that National was not given
timely notice would not bind the tenants in a suit against National to col-
lect on a judgment obtained by the tenants against the insured. National
sought to distinguish the Burch case by arguing that the issue of timely
notice involves a past event, not a hypothetical question. The court inter-
31. 572 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
32. Id at 574.
33. 312 U.S. 270 (1941).
34. 572 S.W.2d at 575.
35. 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1968).
36. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, § I I (Vernon 1965) provides: "When de-
claratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the proceeding."
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preted the Burch case broadly and the Declaratory Judgment Act narrowly
in holding that no justiciable controversy existed.
The Fort Worth court of civil appeals also disallowed the argument that
by a statement made in their summary judgment affidavits, the tenant-
plaintiffs had judicially admitted an interest in the controversy in ques-
tion.37 The court held that no judicial admission existed because the state-
ment was not clear and unequivocal, and in any event, admissions alone
cannot create a justiciable controversy.
The Fort Worth court followed earlier dictates of the Texas Supreme
Court as to the meaning of the Texas constitutional ban on advisory opin-
ions. This traditional view forces a very narrow interpretation of the De-
claratory Judgment Act, which often causes harsh results.38
The Proper Invocation of a Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction. One of the
basic axioms of subject matter jurisdiction is that a court has only such
power as is granted it by either constitution or statute. If a court exceeds
its delegated power, any judgment that it renders is void. The subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of a particular court often depends on the amount in con-
troversy in the suit in question.39 In Byke v. City of Corpus Christi4 ° the
court held that a plaintiffs original petition must contain a specific allega-
tion as to the amount in controversy in order to properly invoke the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court.
The Bykes filed a class action suit against the city of Corpus Christi for
wrongful retention of advance tax payments. They petitioned for the re-
covery of money, but failed to allege a specific sum. The trial court
granted the city of Corpus Christi's motion for summary judgment. That
trial court judgment was reversed and remanded on the ground that the
plaintiffs had failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court because
they had neglected to allege an amount in controversy.4 The district court
then entered judgment for dismissal.
Thereafter the plaintiffs amended their petition to claim damages in ex-
cess of "$500.00 when the amount of damages are aggregated and com-
puted pursuant to Article 1906a."42 When the trial court again dismissed
the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs appealed. The
majority of the civil appeals court concluded that if the original petition
did not allege jurisdictional facts, then the trial court had no jurisdiction,
37. The alleged admission was based on the following statement: "In fact, it would
seem to me to be to my advantage in my lawsuit pending in the 17th Judicial District Court
if there be no attorneys representing Mr. Grace and Mr. Temple at all." 572 S.W.2d at 576.
38. For an additional case dealing with the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act, see Stop
'n Go Mkts., Inc. v. Executive Security Syss., Inc. of America, 556 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
39. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8, for example, limits the subject matter jurisdiction of district
courts to cases involving at least $500.
40. 569 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
41. Byke v. City of Corpus Christi, 541 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, no writ).
42. 569 S.W.2d at 929.
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and the plaintiffs could not cure this jurisdictional defect by merely
amending their pleadings.
The court further held that as a general proposition, the original petition
is critical to the establishment of jurisdiction at the trial court level.43 As a
result, article 1906a, which provides that claims may be aggregated for ju-
risdictional purposes," was held to apply only to the original petition.
Chief Justice Nye filed a dissenting opinion in which he cogently argued
that the use of the term "originally" in article 1906a should be interpreted
liberally to carry out the legislature's intent. 5 In keeping with this ap-
proach, Chief Justice Nye suggested that the word "originally" was used to
distinguish the jurisdiction of the trial court from that of the appellate
court, rather than to distinguish between original and amended petitions.
Today there is no reason to adhere to strict pleading requirements unless
they serve a functional purpose, and no such purpose is served by the ma-
jority's narrow interpretation of article 1906a. As Chief Justice Nye noted:
An original petition may be amended many times (see Rule 63), and
may now be amended without leave of the court as a matter of right
when filed seven days or more before trial. It is the last amended
and/or supplemental petition on which the parties go to trial. It does
not make sense that the Legislature was going into the rule-making
process by prohibiting a party from amending his original petition so
as to join other claims and other parties in order that the aggregate
amount would give the trial court jurisdiction. 6
An objective reading of the general statute clearly supports Chief Justice
Nye's view.
Federal Constitutional Limits on the Exercise of Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion. Courts have been far more lenient when evaluating a state's exer-
cise of legislative jurisdiction, or the power of a state to pass a law that
affects nonlocals,47 than they have been when reviewing an attempted ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction. The current form of the test for legislative
jurisdiction is found in National Geographic Society v. California Board of
Equalization.48 In that case the United States Supreme Court had to de-
termine whether the Society's activities at its California offices provided a
sufficient nexus between the Society and the state to support the state's
imposition of a use-tax-collection liability. The tax was imposed on every
43. Id at 930 (citing Richardson v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.
1967), and 21 C.J.S. Courts § 34 (1940)).
44. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1906a (Vernon 1964). The statute provides:
"Where two or more persons originally and properly join in one suit, the suit for jurisdic-
tional purposes shall be treated as if one party were suing for the aggregate amount of all
their claims added together .... " Id (emphasis added).
45. Legislative intent can be inferred from the fact that art. 1906a was enacted for the
express purpose of overruling Long v. City of Wichita Falls, 142 Tex. 202, 176 S.W.2d 936
(1944), in which the court refused to allow aggregation of monetary claims for jurisdictional
purposes.
46. 569 S.W.2d at 934-35.
47. For a discussion of legislative jurisdiction in general, see R. LEFLAR, supra note 1,§§ 55-62.
48. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
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retailer who engaged in business in California and sold goods for con-
sumption in that state. The Society maintained two offices in California to
solicit advertising for its magazine, but performed no activities in Califor-
nia that were related to its mail order business of selling maps, atlases,
globes, and books.
The Supreme Court held that the imposition of use-tax-collection liabil-
ity on the Society did not violate due process, but the Court refused to
adopt the "slightest presence" test that had been applied by the California
Supreme Court. 9 Instead, the Court held that the Society's activities "ad-
equately establish[ed] a relationship or nexus"50 between it and California.
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the Society that there must
exist a nexus or relationship not only between the seller and the taxing
state, but also between the specific activity of the seller within the state and
the activity sought to be taxed."1 Thus, at least in the limited circum-
stances involved here, due process may be satisfied by nexus activities that
are unrelated to the act of legislative jurisdiction.5 2
Of course, it is well established by Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Min-
ing Co. 3 that personal jurisdiction may be constitutionally based on activ-
ities unrelated to the cause of action if those unrelated activities are
numerous and pervasive. If a defendant is so connected by activity to a
given jurisdiction that the defendant could be considered to be "domi-
ciled" there, then it is not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice to sue the defendant in that jurisdiction, regardless of
where the cause of action arose; it is always fair to sue a defendant in his
own backyard. Unless the contacts with a particular jurisdiction are sub-
stantial enough to warrant the application of the generally affiliating cir-
cumstances rule, however, the affiliating acts must relate to the cause of
action.
This distinction seems to have been overlooked in the case of Navarro v.
Sedco, Inc.,54 which will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections of
this Article.55 The error in Navarro was predicated on the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp.56 In that case the court stated: "If
a 'minimum connection' is all that need be shown to exert the state's power
to tax, aforiori, a non-resident may be required to defend an action in
state court even though the suit bears no relation to the activities deemed
49. Id at 556.
50. Id
51. As the Supreme Court noted, this basis would not support a direct tax upon the
conduct of a foreign individual, but stated: "However fatal to a direct tax a 'showing that
particular transactions are dissociated from the local business ..... . . . such dissociation
does not bar the imposition of the use-tax-collection duty." Id at 560 (citations omitted).
52. Id at 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. 342 U.S. 437, 444-47 (1952).
54. 449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
55. See notes 81-87 & 123-27 infra and accompanying text.
56. 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977), noted in Thomas, Conflict
of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 387 (1978).
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necessary and sufficient to constitute minimum contacts."57 The Fifth Cir-
cuit has failed to distinguish between legislative and personal jurisdiction.
This, coupled with a misplaced reliance on generally affiliating connection
cases, 8 has led, and undoubtedly will continue to lead, to highly suspect
results.59
B. Jurisdiction of the Person
Once a court establishes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a
particular cause of action, it must then determine whether it has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The proper exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion requires that the procedures provided by statute or applicable rule be
properly followed and that such procedures be constitutional.6 °
Satisfaction of Procedural Requirementsfor the Exercise of Personal Juris-
diction. Traditionally, the exercise of personal jurisdiction was tied to
territorial concepts.6 ' In the area of in personam suits various conceptual
means gradually were developed to ameliorate the harshness of a purely
territorial basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.62 Eventually it became ap-
propriate to consider authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction in new ways. 63
In Texas the primary basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents is article 203 1 b,64 which authorizes courts to exercise personal juris-
diction over persons who are "doing business" in the state. Initially the
statute was sufficient to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction to the consti-
tutional limits. As views of constitutional limitations on the exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants changed, however, a question
arose as to the scope of personal jurisdiction sanctioned by article 2031 b.
57. 554 F.2d at 750 (citing its previous ruling in Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473
F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973)).
58. For a good general discussion of the proper analysis of general versus specifically
affiliating cases, see Cornelison v. Chancy, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1976).
59. See notes 123-27 infra and accompanying text.
60. This constitutional question has two aspects. First, the defendant must have suffi-
cient contacts with the forum such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). Secondly, the means ofnotifying the defendants of the lawsuit must amount to
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pres-
ent their objections .... The notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to
convey the required information ... and it must afford a reasonable time for
those interested to make their appearance.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted).
61. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
62. See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (implied consent to jurisdic-
tion and service of process found in receipt of business license); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927) (operation of motor vehicle on state highways indicated implied consent to juris-
diction. and service of process); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856)
(receipt of business license from state indicated implied consent to jurisdiction and service of
process).
63. See generally Wilson, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents." An Invitation
anda Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1957).
64. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
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This was critical since the constitutional question is reached only after it is
first determined that the statutory provision purports to grant jurisdiction.
Numerous decisions grappled with the precise meaning of article 2031b
and various problems surfaced.65 Even if article 203 lb reaches to the max-
imum limits permitted by due process, 66 there are cases that simply fall
outside any reasonable interpretation of "doing business.",67 Article 203 lb
thus became too narrow to guarantee absolutely that a court could focus
on the constitutional limitations of due process rather than engage in
"technical and abstruse attempts to consistently define 'doing business.' "68
Furthermore, there are strict rules of pleading and proof applicable to suits
brought under 2031b that cannot be avoided.69
Given these problems, it was predictable that new enabling provisions
would be enacted to insure that the only limitation on the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresidents would be constitutional. These provi-
sions either could be aimed at solving specific problems or could be
generally worded so as to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
all cases subject only to constitutional limits. Texas has recently adopted
both varieties. The Texas Family Code, for instance, now has enabling
provisions aimed at specific problems,7° and rule 108 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure7 is a general authorization.
In U-Anchor the supreme court laid the foundation for an expanded use
of rule 108 by defining the rule's purpose as being "to permit acquisition of
in personam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits."7 2 This proposal for
avoiding the problems of interpreting the scope of article 2031 b and of
65. See Thomas, supra note 56, at 388-89; Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Arti-
cle 2031b." A New Process is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747, 751-60 (1976), and cases therein.
66. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1063 (1978), held that art. 2031b was to be so construed.
67. See, e.g., Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 549 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1977, no writ) (fathering an illegitimate child in Texas was not within the terms
of art. 2031b; therefore, alleged father was not subject to paternity suit in Texas).
68. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
69. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. 1973); McKanna v.
Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Gourmet, Inc. v. Hurley, 552 S.W.2d 509, 511-13
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
70. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). See generally
Sampson, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Marries the Texas Family Code, 38 TEX. B.J. 1023 (1975);
Sam pson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and Conservatorshoi Suits, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159 (1976).
71. Rule 108 provides in part: "[A] nonresident of the State [served with] notice. . . of
the institution of the suit. . . the same as prescribed for citation to a resident defendant...
shall be required to appear and answer . . . to the full extent that he may be required to
appear and answer under the Constitution of the United States ...." TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
Professor Hans Baade argues that the judicial expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction to
the maximum constitutional limits unconstitutionally derogates from the legislative preroga-
tive, which has thus far been exercised only in the carefully restricted language of such
statutes as art. 2031b and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26 & 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
Letters to the Editor, 38 TEX. B.J. 988 (1975). Rule 108, however, may also be read as a
mere enabling provision for existing long-arm statutes. Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and
Conservatorship Suits, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159, 216-18 (1976).
72. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 n.l (Tex. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
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complying with its attendant strict rules of pleading and proof by using
rule 108 went awry in Alpha Guard, Inc. v. Callahan Chemical Co." The
Austin court of civil appeals held that the plaintiff had not invoked the
jurisdiction of the district court by merely pleading that the corporate, out-
of-state defendant did business in Texas, had no registered agent in Texas,
and thus could be served through the Texas secretary of state pursuant to
article 8.09(B) of the Texas Business Corporation Act"4 and rule 108. The
court found that the district court was without jurisdiction because substi-
tuted service was not made in accordance with the provisions of article
2031 b, but the decision is not well-founded. At least in the portion of the
pleading set forth in the judgment,75 the plaintiff did not invoke article
2031 b. The proper issue, therefore, was whether the requirements of arti-
cle 8.09(B)7 6 and rule 108 were satisfied; article 2031b never should have
surfaced in the court's discussion. Although it will take some time, eventu-
ally the courts of this state should be willing to assert jurisdiction over
nonresidents on some basis other than article 203 lb.77
Extension of authority for the assertion of personal jurisdiction by state
courts in Texas also extends the personal jurisdiction of federal courts sit-
ting in Texas. If a federal court exercises jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in a diversity case, then the extent of the jurisdiction, subject to
the constitutional limits, is determined by the law of the state in which the
court sits." If a federal court exercises jurisdiction in cases arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and a basis for exer-
cising personal jurisdiction is fixed by the provision in question, then it is
followed, and no limitations or lack of authorization under state law ap-
plies.79 In cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States where the basis for exercising personal jurisdiction is not
fixed therein, rule 4 of the federal rules provides for "borrowing" state
statutes.80
73. 568 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
74. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.09 (B) (Vernon 1956).
75. This portion is introduced by the court with the words "respondent pleaded," indi-
cating that this was all of the pleading relevant to the issue presented. 568 S.W.2d at 448.
76. Article 8.09(B) deals with the change of registered office or registered agent of a
foreign corporation and does not seem applicable in this case. Probably the plaintiff meant
to invoke art. 8.10(B), which provides in part:
Whenever a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State
shall fail to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this State, or whenever
any such registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the
registered office, or whenever the certificate of authority of a foreign corpora-
tion shall be revoked, then the Secretary of State shall be an agent of such
corporation upon whom any such process, notice, or demand may be served.
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10(B) (Vernon 1956).
77. See Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ), in
which art. 2031 b was characterized as "the Texas general long-arm statute," and the court
stated that although the facts did not support its application, "Rule 108 may be construed as
a long-arm statute by which personal jurisdiction may be obtained."
78. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
79. Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1977).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
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In Navarro v. Sedco, Inc.8 the court considered the proper scope to be
accorded to rule 4's borrowing provisions. In Navarro the persbnal repre-
sentatives of several Spanish citizens who were killed in a helicopter crash,
which occurred while they were working on a drilling rig operating off the
coast of West Africa, brought suit under the Jones Act82 and the Death on
the High Seas Act.8 3 The plaintiffs sought to base personal jurisdiction on
rule 4(d)(7), which provides for service "in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state in which the district court is held." The plaintiffs urged
that the term "manner" implied that rule 4(d)(7) incorporated only the
method of service of process provided under state law, which would not
include state law limitations on the circumstances under which personal
jurisidiction could be asserted. Hence, the plaintiffs claimed that the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction under rule 4(d)(7) is subject only to constitu-
tional limitations and compliance with article 2031 b is unnecessary.84 The
court, however, held that rule 4(d)(7) applied only to service of process
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court sits and
that authority for service of process outside of the state is contained in rule
4(e). Because the defendants were not served within Texas, the plaintiff
had to meet the requirements of rule 4(e), which provides that service may
be made "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the
applicable statute or order.85 The court interpreted the phrase "under the
circumstances" as requiring that the plaintiff bring himself under the ap-
plicable state law, in this case article 203 1b.86 Thus, in Navarro the plain-
tiffs had to prove that the defendant was amenable to process under article
2031 b, and that assertion of article 2031 b complied with due process. The
court held that since the scope of article 2031 b is limited only by the due
process clause, which has never been interpreted as requiring in all cases
that the plaintiffs cause of action arise directly from defendant's contacts
with the forum, article 2031 b does not require that the cause of the action
arise directly out of the defendant's contacts with Texas. As the assertion
of jurisdiction did not offend due process,' the jurisdiction of the court
was upheld.
The Constitutional Question. International Shoe's interpretation of due
process as requiring that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" be satisfied before a court could exercise jurisdiction over a non-
81. 449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
82. id at 1357.
83. Id
84. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1114-
1115 (1969).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (emphasis added).
86. 449 F. Supp. at 1358 n.l. In a very similar case, Edwards v. Gulf Miss. Marine
Corp., 449 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 n.I (S.D. Tex. 1978), the court held that it did not have to
reach this question because art. 2031b was fully satisfied under the facts in that case.
87. See text accompanying notes 123-27 infra for a discussion of the court's reasoning
on the due process issue.
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resident was understood to be difficult to apply.88 Shaffer v. Heitner'ss9
extension of this standard to in rem and quasi in rem suits as well as to in
personam suits had two results: first, the test, with all of its difficulties,
now applies across the board; and secondly, the nature of pleading and
proof necessary in in rem and quasi in rem causes has changed. Prior to
Shaffer no showing of the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation was necessary in those suits because the territoriality
concept of Pennoyer v. Neff 9° provided for the mutually exclusive sover-
eignty of the states. As a result of the Shaffer decision, however, the type
of showing necessary to demonstrate the satisfaction of traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice must now be made; that is, minimum
contacts must be established. As Mr. Justice Marshall's majority opinion
in Shaffer carefully points out, application of a uniform test for exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresidents
does not ignore the fact that the presence of property in a State may
bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the
forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when
claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying contro-
versy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for
the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In
such cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the State
would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's
protection of his interest. The State's strong interests in assuring the
marketability of property within its borders and in providing a proce-
dure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that
property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that
important records and witnesses will be found in the State.9 '
In Texas, where the jurisdictional facts must be pleaded and proved,92 this
adds a new requirement for in rem and quasi in rem suits. In many cases,
as noted by Mr. Justice Marshall, the satisfaction of constitutional require-
ments will not be difficult.93 Failure of pleading and proof, however, can
be fatal.
The Supreme Court considered the permissible reach of a court over a
nonresident defendant in an in personam suit in Kulko v. Superior Court.9 4
In that case the California Supreme Court concluded that jurisdiction by a
California court over a father domiciled in New York in an action for
child support was proper because first, he actively and fully consented to
88. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Black in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 322 (1945).
89. 443 U.S. 186 (1977).
90. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
91. 443 U.S. at 207-08.
92. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973); McKanna v. Edgar, 388
S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965); Gourmet, Inc. v. Hurley, 552 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1977, no writ).
93. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 60, Comments c & d
(1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; Note, The Power of a State to Affect
Title in a Chattel Atypically Removed to It, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (1947).
94. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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his daughter living in California for the school year and sent her there for
that purpose, and secondly, he benefitted financially from his daughter's
presence in California for nine months of the year. The Supreme Court
found the first ground constitutionally infirm and the second factually in-
accurate and therefore held that the attempted exercise of jurisdiction was
unconstitutional.
The major survey case attempting to apply Shaffer and Kulko is Great
Western United Corp. v. Kidwell.95 Great Western, a Texas corporation,
intended to issue a tender offer in an attempt to take over a publicly owned
Washington corporation with principal executive offices and over fifty per-
cent of its assets located in Idaho. Great Western complied with applica-
ble provisions of the federal provisions regulating takeovers96 and initially
tried to comply with Idaho law.97 When difficulties in compliance with the
Idaho law arose, Great Western filed suit in Texas challenging the Idaho
law as unconstitutional on the grounds that it was pre-empted by the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and created an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. The jurisdictional question presented was whether
due process permits a court in Texas to exercise jurisdiction over an Idaho
official charged by Idaho law with preventing a Texas based corporation
from proceeding with a takeover of an Idaho based corporation.
The problem has two aspects: first, the statutory authority for acquiring
such jurisdiction must be established; and secondly, the exercise of that
authority must be consistent with constitutional requirements. In address-
ing the question of statutory authority in Texas, the Fifth Circuit has
tended either to read the language of article 2031 b9" very broadly, or sim-
ply to ignore that language and focus on the Texas Supreme Court's state-
ment that article 203 1b is intended to reach to the constitutional limits.99
As another commentator has noted,"° the latter approach ignores the re-
quirement in article 2031 b that the tort be committed in whole or in part
within the state.'' In Great Western the court followed the former course
and concluded that article 2031b authorized the exercise of jurisdiction.
The court then considered the constitutional issue of whether the effects
caused in Texas by actions taken in Idaho were sufficient to satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement. Fortunately, in answering this question
the Fifth Circuit did not rely on National Geographic nor did it improperly
cite Perkins.'0 2 The generality of the minimum contacts test causes differ-
95. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
96. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) (1976) (Williams Act).
97. See 577 F.2d at 1263 for applicable provisions of the Idaho law.
98. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
99. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cerl. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
100. Thomas, supra note 56, at 393-96.
101. Rule 108 would probably provide a sounder basis for reaching the constitutional
issue. See notes 61-77 supra and accompanying text.
102. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see notes 47-54 supra and
accompanying text.
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ences of opinion, however, even when the proper precedents are relied on.
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonable-
ness," the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not sus-
ceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must
be weighed to determine whether the requisite "affiliating circum-
stances" are present. . . . We recognize that this determination is one
in which few answers will be written "in black and white. The greys
are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable."[03
Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, found that the minimum contacts
test was met under the facts of this case. Relying on cases previously de-
cided by the Fifth Circuit, Judge Wisdom stated that contacts need not
arise from actual physical activity in the forum state; rather, activities in
other forums that had foreseeable effects in the forum state would suffice.
The court argued that the facts of the instant case were analogous to those
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,' °4 which held that sufficient
minimum contacts were established when an out-of-state insurer sent an
insurance contract to a resident of the state asserting jurisdiction. Al-
though the court acknowledged that contacts by the plaintiff, here Great
Western's initial voluntary filing in Idaho, cannot produce minimum con-
tacts, it urged that the language in Hanson v. Denckla °5 requiring the de-
fendant to purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state should not be read too literally.' Instead, the
thrust should be that unilateral action by the plaintiff alone is not enough.
Even if the requirement of Hanson v. Denckla °7 were to be applied liter-
ally, however, Judge Wisdom believed that it would be satisfied in this
case. Judge Wisdom found that Idaho intended the effects of its tender
offer regulations to be felt in Texas, and that by expecting Texas to honor
criminal judgments and to help insure that violators in Texas go to trial in
Idaho, Idaho purposefully conducted activities in Texas. Since Idaho had
"[d]eliberately cast [its] regulatory net across the United States,"' 10 8 it did
not offend traditional notions of justice and fair play to require an Idaho
official to travel out of state to defend a constitutional challenge brought
by a participant in a non-Idaho transaction. The opinion carefully pointed
out that jurisdiction was not grounded on the "practical effect" of the
Idaho statute in Texas, but rather on the attempted regulation of Great
Western's Texas based business activities.' 0 9
Judge Godbold dissented on the ground that the court could not consti-
tutionally assert jurisdiction under the facts of this case. Although he held
that the tripartite relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
103. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (citations omitted).
104. 355 U.S 220 (1957).
105. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
106. 577 F.2d at 1268 (citing Judge Goldberg's argument in Product Promotions, Inc. v.
Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974)). The hanson requirement was reasserted in
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978).
107. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).




litigation was central to the due process inquiry, 110 he placed primary em-
phasis on the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Unlike the major-
ity, Judge Godbold concluded that the requirement that the defendant
purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protection of the forum
state's laws cannot merely mean that the plaintiffs unilateral activity is
insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over the defendant. "Rather it
embodies the idea that it is in part the defendant's enjoyment of the bene-
fits and protection of a state's laws that makes it fair to require the defend-
ant to appear in the state's courts.""' The dissent found no such
purposeful enjoyment of protection. Idaho's expectation that Texas offi-
cials would honor criminal judgments obtained under the takeover law
was of no benefit because a valid criminal judgment depends on the state's
establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants; once this is estab-
lished, help by Texas would be unnecessary. Judge Godbold viewed the
other alleged benefits as too attenuated and speculative to create a basis for
jurisdiction. Further, while the nature of the defendant's acts had an im-
pact in Texas, the cause of action arose neither from the defendant's caus-
ing physical injury in the state nor from his conducting commercial
transactions in the state. Judge Godbold, therefore, believed that the na-
ture and quality of the defendant's contacts with Texas would not support
jurisdiction. 12
Having concluded that the defendant's contacts with the forum, the most
important aspect of the tripartite relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, was not sufficient to support jurisdiction, Judge
Godbold proceeded to analyze the interests of the forum. Texas' interest
in redressing tortious conduct or breaches of contracts committed in whole
or in part in the state was not involved here. In Judge Godbold's view, the
forum's only interest was in allowing its residents to use Texas courts to
sue nonresidents, a very weak interest at best.
Finally, Judge Godbold was troubled by the possible ramifications of
what he called the "majority's effects test.""' 3 He noted that California's
strict requirements for automobile pollution devices have an immense and
foreseeable impact on General Motors and queried whether that meant
that General Motors could sue California regulators in Michigan.
The major issue presented in Kidwell was a close one. The majority was
probably correct in concluding that physical acts within a state are not
necessary in order for an assertion of jurisdiction to be constitutional.
Nevertheless, the requirement of Hanson v. Denckla' " that there be a pur-
110. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
111. 577 F.2d at 1288-89.
112. Judge Godbold distinguished the case at hand from the cases relied on by the ma-
jority, Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975), vacatedon other grounds,
552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977), and Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F.
Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1971), in both of which price fixing was found to have an impact on
the forum state, on the grounds that this action bore little resemblance to a damages action
sounding in tort. 577 F.2d at 1290 n.6.
113. 577 F.2d at 1291.
114. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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poseful availing of the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws
must be met. Here, due to both the lack of any such purposeful conduct
and the paucity of legitimate forum state concerns, the dissent reached the
better conclusion.
Assertion of Jurisdiction. During the survey period there were many
other cases dealing with the assertion of jurisdiction. The most important
of these will be briefly noted under the general heading of tort, contract,
and family law.
Tort. Bass v. Metzger..5 was precipitated by an unhappy and compli-
cated business arrangement. One of the disgruntled business participants
signed a theft complaint, which was later dismissed. The defendant in the
aborted criminal case then filed a malicious prosecution suit in which an
issue arose concerning jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The
court held that a party who merely signed checks drawn on a Texas bank
account did not have sufficient contacts with Texas to be constitutionally
subjected to suit in that state. The drawer of the checks was a nonresident
corporate official of a company that had previously been exonerated by
jury findings of any liability. Based on the authority of U-AnchorAdvertis-
ing, Inc. v. Burt,"16 the court upheld the special appearance by the corpo-
rate official, who had been sued individually.
In Walker v. Newgent" 7 the Fifth Circuit considered whether a United
States citizen who was injured in an automobile accident in Germany
could sue General Motors and Opel in Texas on the basis of negligence,
strict liability, and breach of express and implied warranties. The automo-
bile in question was manufactured for use in, sold in, and used exclusively
in Germany. Opel transacted no business in Texas.
The plaintiff predicated in personam jurisdiction on article 2031b." 8
The court found that
Opel, a German corporation, has neither assets, office, agents, nor em-
ployees in Texas . . . . [and] even though Opel sold cars to Buick
Motor Division of GM, the car in question was a model which was
not manufactured for export and in fact was sold second-hand in Ger-
many; further, regarding those cars which were sold for export, title
passed in Germany, and no contracts for sale were entered into or to
be performed in the State of Texas.'9
Furthermore, no tort was committed either in whole or in part in Texas
since the automobile was designed and manufactured in Germany and the
accident occurred in Germany.
Nevertheless, the jurisdiction alleged could have been established if the
relationship between General Motors, which does business in Texas, and
Opel, a subsidiary corporation, had been one which would allow imputa-
115. 569 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
117. 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978).
118. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
119. 583 F.2d at 166.
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tion of parent activities to the subsidiary. 2° The record, however, was
found to be devoid of facts supporting a prima facie case of an agency
relationship.
The final question to be considered was whether the foreseeable effects
test articulated in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell12 ' was applicable.
The court stated that Opel's activities in Germany did not have foreseeable
effects in Texas, "especially since the automobile in question was not man-
ufactured for export and was sold only domestically."' 122 The court also
relied on the holding in Great Western that there must be some activity by
the defendant in Texas and not simply unilateral activity in that state by
the plaintiff. Since it appeared that the action was brought in Texas solely
because the plaintiff had become a Texas resident, the court affirmed the
district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The final two tort cases to be treated were decided by Judge Singleton of
the Southern District of Texas. In Navarro v. Sedco, Inc.123 the personal
representatives of several Spanish nationals who were killed in a helicopter
crash off the coast of West Africa brought suit against the Canadian corpo-
ration that owned and operated the helicopter involved. The court con-
cluded that jurisdiction would lie based on the defendant's continuous
purchases of goods and services in Texas and its leasing of a helicopter
from a Texas company. The court found that a cause of action need not
arise directly out of the defendant's contacts with the forum state in order
to uphold jurisdiction. In so doing the court improperly relied upon Per-
kins and National Geographic.'24 The court concluded that requiring the
Canadian corporation to defend the suit in Texas would not cause it such
inconvenience or hardship as to amount to a denial of due process.
The court's cavalier admission that "the State of Texas has no particular
interest in providing a forum for non-resident plaintiffs suing non-resident
defendants on a cause of action to which Texas law will not apply"' 2' does
little to help bring its assertion of jurisdiction within the tripartite test of
Shaffer and Kulko. ' 26 The court seems to have disregarded the message of
Shaffer that there are still restrictions on a court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction.
Edwards v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Corp. 127 involved a suit brought by
the United States and foreign citizens arising out of the sinking of a vessel
120. See Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974), and cases cited
therein. See also Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975) (holding that a
suit against a subsidiary stopped the running of the statute of limitations against its parent).
121. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978); see notes 95-113 supra and accompanying text.
122. 583 F.2d at 168.
123. 449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
124. There was an insufficient showing of generally affiliating circumstances to apply the
reasoning of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), and National
Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977), concerned legisla-
tive, not personal, jurisdiction. See notes 47-59 supra and accompanying text.
125. 449 F. Supp. at 1363.
126. See notes 88-94 supra and accompanying text. Note that Kulko had not been
handed down at the time Nayarro was decided.
127. 449 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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approximately twenty-five miles off the coast of Iran. Relying heavily on
the rationale in Navarro, the court upheld jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent corporate defendants. These two decisions demonstrate the injustices
that are possible if in a non-Perkins situation the act furnishing the juris-
dictional basis need not be related to the cause of action.
Contract. In Diversi!/ed Resources Corp. v. Geodynamics Oil & Gas,
Inc. '28 a Texas based corporation sued an Illinois based corporation for
failure to abide by the terms of a settlement entered into in a suit filed in a
Texas federal court. The settlement required the Illinois based corporation
to pay cash in Texas and to execute an installment promissory note paya-
ble in Texas. Upon partial failure of payment, the Texas based corpora-
tion filed suit in a Texas district court and the Illinois based corporation
entered an unsuccessful special appearance.
On appeal the court upheld the district court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The court distinguished U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt 129 because in
this case there was more than a naked agreement to pay in Texas for serv-
ices performed out of state. Entering into a settlement of a lawsuit on file
in a Texas federal court and agreeing that payment was to be made in
Texas amounted to purposeful conduct that invoked the benefits and pro-
tection of Texas law.
Personal jurisdiction was again in issue in a suit to enforce a settlement
agreement in Dow Chemical Co. v. Napp-Grecco Co. 130 Upon the destruc-
tion of a liquified natural gas storage facility in New York, numerous per-
sonal injury and wrongful death actions were filed by individuals in New
York against the Texas corporations that owned the facility. The Texas
corporations then filed suit in Texas against the Dow Chemical Company,
which in turn filed a third party action against a nonresident corporation.
The Texas corporations entered into a settlement agreement with the third
party nonresident corporation whereby the third party agreed to provide
the Texas corporations with documents, evidence, and witnesses under its
control. The question then became whether the performance of these set-
tlement terms constituted conduct sufficient to subject the third party non-
resident corporation to a Texas court's jurisdiction.
The court concluded that entering into and executing the agreement did
not amount to a purposeful act or transaction in Texas. The underlying
basis for all the suits occurred in New York, the nonresident did not initi-
ate the filing of any suit in Texas, there was neither the expectation nor the
necessity of invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law, and the
agreement was solicited, negotiated, and consummated in New York.
Thus, under the authority of Hanson v. Denkla"3 I and U-Anchor, the court
could find no basis for subjecting the defendant to suit in Texas.
128. 558 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
129. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
130. 565 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
[Vol. 33
CONFLICT OF LAWS
A suit on an alleged contract to pay for architectural services and for the
supervision of the construction of a synagogue in Maine came before the
Fifth Circuit in Barnstone v. Congregation Am Echad.'32 The Congrega-
tion Am Echad invited Barnstone, an architect with residence and princi-
pal place of business in Houston, Texas, to make a presentation in order to
be considered for the architectural commission. The commission was ulti-
mately awarded to Barnstone, and the project was commenced. All plans,
sketches, models, and drawings were prepared in Houston. In addition,
the congregation directed some correspondence to Barnstone in Houston.
Most of the other contacts, however, were in Maine,'33 and the congrega-
tion had no connections with Texas that were unrelated to this transaction.
No conclusion was reached as to whether there was an executed formal
contract because the court decided that, in any event, it was the place of
performance, rather than that of execution, consummation, or delivery,
that should govern the determination of jurisdiction.' 34 In a dictum the
court also said that the choice of law provision in the alleged contract
would have no effect on the jurisdictional question.
Without admitting that article 203 lb was satisfied, the court nonetheless
turned to the constitutional issue,'3 5 and after careful consideration, con-
cluded that jurisdiction did not lie. The legal analysis relied almost exclu-
sively on Hanson v. Denckla'36 and O'Brien P. Lanpar Co.,' 37 emphasizing
the necessity of purposeful activity within Texas and the invocation of the
benefits and protection of Texas' laws. This analysis was, of course, some-
what different from that employed by the majority of the Fifth Circuit in
Great Western. 13
Family Law. During the previous survey period the primary case in-
volving long-arm jurisdiction under the Texas Family Code was Zeisler v.
Zeisler, 139 in which jurisdiction was asserted under section 11.051 of the
132. 574 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1978) (Morgan, Clark & Tjoflat, JJ.).
133. Barnstone had to procure a Maine license in order to be able to supervise the con-
struction of the synagogue, and all meetings, presentations, and supervision of construction
took place in Maine.
134. 574 F.2d at 288-89 (citing Arthur, Ross & Peters v. Housing, Inc., 508 F.2d 562 (5th
Cir. 1975); Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966)).
135. Many courts will interpret a jurisdictional statute as authorizing the assertion of
jurisdiction only after first determining that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend due
process. See, e.g., notes 123-27 supra and accompanying text. If an assertion of jurisdiction
would be unconstitutional, these courts will find that statutory authorization is lacking. The
questions of authorization and constitutionality are not necessarily coterminous, however,
depending on the scope of the jurisdictional statute involved. In California the two ques-
tions are identical, as the California statute provides: "A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 is to the same
effect, see note 71 supra, but art. 203 1b is not so broadly worded. See notes 64-69 supra and
accompanying text.
136. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
137. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
138. See text accompanying notes 95-113 supra for a discussion of Great Western.
139. 553 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd); see Thomas, supra note
56, at 396-98, for a discussion of Zeisler.
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Code.'4 During the present survey period this section was again a source
of controversy, this time in the case of Corliss v. Smith.'
4
Plaintiff Dan Corliss and defendant Vivian Corliss Smith were married
in Massachusetts in 1962. In 1965 they moved to Dallas, Texas, where
their two children were born. In 1972 the parties were divorced in Dallas
County and the defendant was given custody of the children. The defend-
ant remarried, moved to Nebraska, and established her permanent domi-
cile there. From 1972 until the time of suit, the defendant and her children
had not been physically present in Texas. Plaintiff filed suit in Texas in
December 1976, seeking divided custody.' 42 Jurisdiction was asserted
under section 11.051 of the Texas Family Code, which provides:
[I]n a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the court may exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a person of whom service of citation is
required . ..although the person is not a resident or domiciliary of
this state, if:
(1) the child was conceived in this state and the person on whom
service is required is a parent or an alleged or probable father of the
child;
(3) the person on whom service is required has resided with the
child in this state; or
(4) notwithstanding Subdivisions (1), (2), or (3) above, there is any
basis consistent with the constitutions of this state or the United
States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 143
By the terms of the statute, jurisdiction can now be exercised when either
fact situation (1) or (3) is established; (4) is a catchall that provides an
additional jurisdictional base.
In the present action options (1) and (3) both conferred statutory author-
ization for the exercise of jurisdiction under the facts of this case. In addi-
tion, however, it must be established that these facts are sufficient to satisfy
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court first
noted that extraterritorial jurisdiction over the person has been more ex-
pansive in the context of contract and tort cases than in domestic relations
litigation because the full faith and credit clause is more narrowly inter-
preted in this latter class of cases. With this principle to guide it, the court
proceeded with its analysis.
Since the primary concern of any custody determination is the children's
best interests, the court properly focused on the issue of which forum
would be most likely to produce a proper determination of this ultimate
140. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
141. 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
142. Although the petition was couched in terms of a possessory conservatorship, the
court held that the pleadings amounted to a request for divided custody due to the extent of
the visitation privileges requested. Id. at 170.
143. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). For a general discussion
of the long-arm provisions of the Family Code, see Sampson, supra note 7 1; Comment, The
Jurisdiction of Texas Courts in Interstate Child Custody Disputes: 4 Functional Approach, 54




issue. Ordinarily, the domiciliary state of the children is in the best posi-
tion to make this determination because the parties likely to know about
the children and their living conditions are their neighbors, teachers, doc-
tors, and ministers, all of whom are most available at the forum where the
children are domiciled. Such witnesses are subject to subpoena power in
the forum of the children's domicile, but may not be elsewhere. Indeed, in
this case a Texas court would have no such power over important nonresi-
dent witnesses. Under this analysis, Texas had little interest in asserting
jurisdiction, at least as compared to Nebraska.
In addition, the passage of time attenuated the defendant's contacts with
Texas. The court relied on a six-month limitation on jurisdiction in an
intrastate context found within the Family Code,'" and concluded that a
presumption arises that a Texas court is neither a convenient nor a compe-
tent forum in a case in which the children have been gone from Texas for
more than six months. Due to the absence of sufficient proof to overcome
this presumption, the court properly concluded that jurisdiction could not
be constitutionally asserted.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Tort
Prior to 1975 the Texas Supreme Court interpreted article 4678145 as
mandating the application of the law of the place of the consummation of
the tort in all wrongful death cases.' 46  In 1975 article 4678 was
amended 47 to enable Texas courts to develop choice of law principles to
govern these tort cases. Thus far, however, no cases have arisen to which
revised article 4678 would apply.
In Cass v. Estate of McFarland141 the court refused to apply the amend-
ment retroactively and held that the unamended version of the article was
applicable. In that case the surviving wife, child, and parents of Armando
Cass-Ruiz brought a wrongful death suit in Texas. Cass-Ruiz was killed
when the airplane on which he was a passenger crashed in the Republic of
Mexico. The flight had originated in the State of New Mexico. The de-
fendants obtained a dismissal of the suit on the grounds that only the law
of Mexico could give rise to a cause of action, and since Mexico's laws
were so unlike Texas' laws, a Mexican court should decide the case.149
144. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06 (Vernon 1975).
145. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 156, at 365 (TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon
1952)).
146. Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1972); Marmon v. Mustang Avi-
ation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
147. See Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 268, 292
(1976).
148. 564 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
149. The court cited Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), in support of this proposition. It is to be hoped that a wooden application
of this doctrine will disappear when Texas courts have an opportunity to apply amended art.
4678.
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If amended article 4678 had been applicable, the dismissal might have
been avoided because the article now permits recovery for the death of
citizens of Texas or the United States 15 ° caused by the wrongful act, ne-
glect, or default of another in any foreign state "for which a right to main-
tain an action . . . is given by the statute or law of such foreign State or
country or of this State."'' Although the amended statute does not man-
date a choice of Texas law, it makes such a choice permissible and, there-
fore, would defeat the basis of the dismissal.
The court, however, refused to give the amendment retroactive effect in
the absence of clear contrary legislative intent.'52 If a statute deals with
procedural or remedial matters rather than matters of substance, a court
would be more willing to give the statute a retroactive effect. Since the
amendment to article 4678 deals with the "positive law of duties and rights
which give rise to a cause of action," ' however, it is a substantive rovi-
sion, and consequently it was not allowed to have such an effect. ' T
B. Contract
The variety of choice of law rules available in the context of contract
cases involving multi-state contacts has led Professor Leflar to say that
"[njo area in the law of conflict of laws was more confused in its develop-
ment than that concerning the general validity of contracts. The confusion
is by no means ended."' 55 Indeed, the Restatement Second itself invites
consideration of multiple and potentially conflicting elements without in-
dicating any priorities.' 56 This wealth of possibilities makes it unlikely
that contract cases involving choice of law will raise any new questions.
Nonetheless, several interesting issues were considered in this area during
the survey period.
Because of the difficulty in predicting the outcome of a choice of law
problem in a contract case, the preferred approach is to agree to a gov-
erning law in the contract itself.'57 Even this approach, however, may fail
150. The plaintiffs in this case were residents of New York and Arizona and presumably
citizens of the United States.
151. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (emphasis added).
152. 564 S.W.2d at 110. See also Brooks v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 412
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
153. Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Canales, 499 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154. Accord, Penry v. Win. Bart, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Gutierrez v.
Collins, 570 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
155. R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 144, at 295.
156. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 93, §§ 6, 188. See also Sedler,
The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second). An Analysis and a Critique, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1972).
There apparently exists some confusion as to whether Texas has adopted the most signifi-
cant relations doctrine, as set out by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Some
federal cases indicate that Texas courts have in fact adopted this approach. See, e.g., Lip-
schutz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1974). This conclusion is
uncertain, however, and has been the subject of some criticism. Thomas, Conflict of Laws,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 244, 256-59 (1975).
157. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 93, § 187.
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to insure the desired result. An example of this is found in Hunt v. Coastal
States Gas Producing Co. 158 Hunt had entered into a concession agreement
with Libya for the purpose of oil exploration and development. Hunt dis-
covered an oil field, which was subsequently expropriated by the Libyan
Government. Plaintiff Hunt challenged the expropriation, arguing that in-
ternational rather than Libyan law governed the dispute due to a choice of
law provision in the concession agreement. The clause in question read:
This Concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of Inter-
national Law and in the absence of such common principles, then by
and in accordance with the general principles of law, including such
of those principles as may have been applied by international tribu-
nals.' 59
The court concluded that the quoted clause dealt solely with arbitration
and did not address the nature of rights granted or acquired under the
contract. Since under Libyan law Libya had never relinquished rights to
the oil, there was no appropriation, and the act of state doctrine precluded
further judicial inquiry into Libya's actions. 160
Disputes also can arise as to the meaning of choice of law provisions in
contracts between individuals, as is demonstrated by Black v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co. 161 The plaintiff opened a margin account with a brokerage
firm and as part of that transaction executed a customer's agreement,
which provided that its terms and enforcement would be governed by the
laws of New York. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit alleging that the
brokerage firm had charged a usurious rate of interest under Texas law.1
62
Plaintiff sought to avoid the choice of New York law as provided for in
the customer's agreement by arguing that the choice of law provision did
not apply to interest rates charged because a subsequent paragraph in the
customer's agreement provided for interest to be charged in accordance
with the terms of a separate credit agreement. The court reviewed the
paragraphs in question and concluded that the choice of law provision was
not limited in scope or application, but constituted an unambiguous stipu-
lation of the parties that the stock transactions that were made pursuant to
the agreement would be governed by the laws of New York. 63 Since the
interest rates charged were not illegal under New York law, the court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant.
C. Statute
In some instances in which contractual disputes involving contacts with
158. 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ granted).
159. Id. at 509.
160. See notes 4-19 supra and accompanying text.
161. 559 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
162. See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 152 (discussing usurious contracts).
163. The court cited City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515
(Tex. 1968); Harris County v. Howard, 494 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.]




more than one state arise the choice of law is provided by statute. Perhaps
the best known such provision, section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial
Code,"' was involved in a rather unique way in Calloway v. Manion.
65
As Judge Thornberry aptly put it, the "suit concerns a horse trade gone
lame."' 166 Plaintiff traded Red Rose Ray, a gelding, to defendant for Our
Candy Barett, a mare. The horse trade took place at the home of the de-
fendant in Springfield, Illinois. Plaintiff was from Texas and returned
there with the mare. After the trade, the mare proved to be suffering from
an incipient ovary condition that caused her to kick repeatedly, thus injur-
ing her hock. Plaintiff sued in Texas, seeking rescission and monetary
damages.
After noting that the court sitting in a diversity case must apply the
choice of law rules of the state in which it sits, 167 the court turned its atten-
tion to the parties' stipulation that their transaction was to be controlled by
the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Texas. Article 1.105168 pro-
vides that parties may choose the law of any state bearing a reasonable
relation to the transaction. 69 The law chosen in Calloway bore a reason-
able relationship to the transaction, but as the court noted, this section of
the Code refers to pre-dispute agreements. Nonetheless, the court applied
the law of Texas in accordance with the parties' stipulation.
III. JUDGMENTS
The cases in this section deal with questions concerning the finality of
judgments, the effect of judgments, and whether particular judgments can
be attacked directly or collaterally either in Texas or in some other state.
There were many judgment cases during the survey period, most of which
followed established rules. Several of the illustrative and more interesting
cases will be treated briefly.
A. Full Faith and Credit. Divorce Decrees and Property Divisions
In Gerhardt v. Welsch "° a divorced wife brought suit against her former
husband for a partition of his military retirement benefits. Plaintiff and
defendant had been divorced in the State of Washington. The divorce de-
cree had adopted and approved a property settlement agreement executed
by the parties, but neither the agreement nor the decree mentioned the
military retirement benefits.
Since the Washington divorce decree was final, it was entitled to full
faith and credit in Texas,'' which meant that the Texas court had to give
164. U.C.C. § 1-105.
165. 572 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1978).
166. Id. at 1035.
167. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
168. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
169. Section 1.105 contains additional restrictions that are not applicable under the facts
of this case.
170. 568 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
171. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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the decree the same effect it would have had in Washington. 72 Hence, the
court had to look to Washington law to determine the decree's effect.' 73
The Texas court therefore was tasked with a role not unlike that of a fed-
eral court sitting in a diversity case. In performing its role, the court deter-
mined that (1) under Washington law the husband's unaccrued pension
right was community property at the time of the divorce, (2) under Wash-
ington law parties to a divorce action become tenants in common of com-
munity property that is not disposed of by the divorce decree, and (3) the
plaintiff was entitled to a partition upon a proper showing of the extent of
the property in question.
The resolution of this issue led to a different result for the divorced wife
in Elmer v. Elmer.'74 A Kansas court had granted a divorce, but the de-
cree had not mentioned the military retirement benefits that were the sub-
ject of the suit. After conceding that the wife would be entitled to a one-
half interest in benefits under Texas law, 175 the court correctly applied the
law of Kansas, under which the wife was estopped from filing suit to re-
cover property that could have been recovered in the divorce action it-
self.'
76
B. Full Faith and Credit. Default Judgment Cases
The cases in this subsection deal with two necessary prerequisites to a
finding that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit: first, the court
rendering the decree must have jurisdiction; and secondly, the judgment
must be final.
The first of these questions was raised in Shelby International, Inc. v.
Wiener.17 7 Shelby, a California corporation with a warehouse and sales-
men in Texas, was in the business of selling custom automobile wheels.
Wiener was successfully solicited in Texas as a Shelby customer, and cus-
tom wheels were shipped to him in Texas from locations in both Texas and
California. Since there was no agreed place of payment, payment also was
made both in California and in Texas. Although Wiener had used
Shelby's WATS line to telephone orders to California, he had never been
to California on matters related to the transactions in question.
Shelby sued Wiener in Los Angeles. 7 Wiener was cited, but did not
appear. Default judgment was rendered for Shelby, who then sought en-
forcement of his judgment in Texas under the full faith and credit doc-
trine. The issue was whether the California court had jurisdiction. If a
rendering court lacks jurisdiction, its decree is not entitled to full faith and
172. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
173. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874).
174. 567 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
175. The court cited Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970), in support of this
proposition.
176. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 171 Kan. 390, 233 P.2d 517 (1951).
177. 563 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
178. The suit was brought pursuant to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1977).
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credit. "'79 If the defendant actually appears in the action, however, he is
bound by the judgment, including its determination as to jurisdiction.1 0
If, however, as here, the default judgment is taken against a nonappearing
nonresident, the nonresident often will "relitigate" the constitutionality of
the rendering court's jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks to enforce his
judgment.' Wiener followed that procedure in this case, and the court,
after a review of authority, concluded that the California court had no
jurisdiction over him, and thus denied recovery.
The second issue that is frequently raised in default judgment cases con-
cerns the finality of the judgment, a question that was considered by the
court in Williams v. Washington.'82 Williams was sued by the State of
Washington in a Washington court under the Washington Consumer Pro-
tection Act.' 83 Williams did not appear and suffered a default judgment.
The judgment provided for the recovery of civil penalties and attorney's
fees, and also granted an injunction. Enforcement of that judgment was
sought in Texas.
The Washington judgment provided that "[//urisdiction is retained for
the purpose of enabling either party to this judgment and decree to apply
to the court at any time for the enforcement of compliance therewith, the
punishment of violations thereof, or modfication . . . thereof."' 8 4 Since
full faith and credit is not required when a decree is subject to modification
and, therefore, is not final,' 8 5 the question was whether the quoted lan-
guage reserved a power of modification that rendered the decree nonfinal.
First, it was argued that retention of jurisdiction by a court to modify
injunctive relief does not normally affect the finality of the decree. Al-
though the court agreed with this general rule, ' 86 after review of the decree
as a whole the court concluded that the jurisdictional retention applied to
all relief granted; thus, the judgment did not fall under the "injunction"
exception to finality.
Second, it was argued that the judgment was final under the laws of
Washington, the rendering state. Notwithstanding the apparent retention
of jurisdiction on its face, Washington argued that affirmance on appeal
had "finalized" the judgment. The court reviewed the available Washing-
ton law and concluded that affirmance of the judgment on appeal only
effectuated it; the judgment was not finalized by the affirmance.
Third, it was argued that "under Washington law, an appellate court is
presumed to determine its jurisdiction before it decides the merits of the
179. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See also R. LEFLAR, Supra
note 1, § 19.
180. R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, §§ 30, 79.
181. Of course, by staying home and simply suffering a default judgment in the foreign
state the party loses his right to a trial on the merits of the cause of action.
182. 566 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas .1978, writ granted).
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86 (1978).
184. 566 S.W.2d at 55 (emphasis added by Texas court).
185. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
186. The court cited Stovall v. Banks, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 583 (1870), and City of Tyler v.
St. Louis Sw. Ry., 405 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1966), in support of this proposition.
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appeal. According to this argument, [the court] should presume that the
Washington appellate courts held this judgment to be final before they
rendered their judgments."'' 8 7 The court correctly rejected this argument,
noting that it incorrectly equates finality for purposes of amenability to
appeal with finality for purposes of full faith and credit. "Finality for the
purpose of Full Faith and Credit is not determined by whether the judg-
ment is final for appellate purposes; rather the question under Full Faith
and Credit is whether the judgment is subject to modification under the law
of the rendering state."'
' 8 8
Finally, Washington argued that even if the judgment in question was
not final, and, therefore, not entitled to full faith and credit, it should still
be enforced on the basis of comity between the states. The court rejected
the comity doctrine in this case because judgments entered by a Texas
court cannot be enforced by execution unless all parties and claims in-
volved in the litigation have been disposed of,' s9 and the court refused to
accord greater dignity to a foreign judgment. Having rejected each of the
arguments advanced by the plaintiffs, the court denied enforcement of the
Washington judgment.
Perhaps the court should have given greater consideration to the plain-
tiffs finality argument, but since the record on appeal does not disclose the
entire decree, it is difficult to judge. In any event, the comity argument
seems to be strong in this case. Comity is founded on mutual interest,
conscience, and the moral necessity to do justice in order that justice may
be done in return.'9 ° In light of the fact that the Texas Legislature has
expressed an interest in consumer protection,' 9' conscience and the moral
necessity of doing justice could have easily called for the use of the comity
doctrine under the facts of this case.
C. Full Faith and Credit: Statutory Variation
Although the full faith and credit clause requires only that final judg-
ments be given the same effect in the forum state as they would have in the
rendering state, state statutes may provide that foreign judgments be given
even greater effect. In Strobel v. Thurman'92 the much litigated section
14.10 of the Texas Family Code 9 3 was held to grant a foreign judgment
187. 566 S.W.2d at 56.
188. Id. The court cited Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Hicks v. Hefner, 210 Kan.
79, 499 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1972); Robertson v. Cason, 203 So.2d 742, 745 (La. App. 1967).
189. See Trigg v. Royal Indem. Co., 468 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no
writ; McMillan v. McMillan, 67 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, no writ),
190. See Nowell v. Nowell, 408 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ dism'd),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
191. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
192. 565 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978).
193. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon 1975); see Trader v. Dear, 565 S.W.2d 233
(Tex. 1978) (§ 14.10 overruled old law which permitted a habeas corpus proceeding to be
used to relitigate issue of child custody); Saucier v. Pena, 559 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1977) (court
had power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to compel delivery of child to parent entitled to
immediate possession); Lamphere v. Chrisman, 554 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1977) (parent entitled
to issuance of writ immediately upon showing right to custody under existing court order);
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more effect than it had in the rendering state. Walter and Joan Stroble
were divorced in Indiana, and the court granted custody of their child to
Mrs. Strobel. The child lived with his mother in Massachusetts, and Mr.
Strobel moved to Texas. Immediately after his son arrived for a visit, Mr.
Strobel filed suit in the district court of Travis County, seeking to modify
the Indiana custody decree.
Mrs. Strobel then filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the
district court of Travis County. The district court denied Mrs. Strobel's
application, citing the best interest of the child. Normally, the only ques-
tion would have been whether or not the district court's denial of the appli-
cation somehow failed to give full faith and credit to the Indiana divorce
decree. Under section 14.10, however, proof of an outstanding valid order
compels the court hearing the application for habeas corpus to respect both
the prior order and the continuing jurisdiction of the court that rendered it.
This is true even though under its own law the foreign court does not have
continuing jurisdiction. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court held that the dis-
trict court should have respected the "continuing" jurisdiction of the Indi-
ana court and granted the writ.
McElreath v. Stewart, 545 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1977) (habeas corpus proceeding should be used
to determine matters concerning immediate welfare of child); Standley v. Stewart, 539
S.W.2d 882 (Tex. 1976) (court lacked authority to treat habeas corpus hearing as one to
modify prior custody order). See also Smith, Commentary on Title Two, Texas Family Code,
5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 389, 435-36 (1974); Comment, Child Custody Modfication and the Fam-
ily Code, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 725 (1976).
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